Experts discuss Russian-Turkish relations and their international ramifications

On March 23rd, Johns Hopkins University hosted a discussion about Russian-Turkish relations and how they affect the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as the Middle East. 

Featured at the discussion were Kurt Volker, Olga Oliker, Eric Edelman, Avinoam Iden, and Svante Cornell, who was tasked with opening the talk. 

Eric Edelman, former Ambassador to Turkey, was quick to remind the audience that conflict between Russia and Turkey is not a new phenomenon. For centuries, the Russian and Ottoman Empire fought each other. When Russia was overtaken by the communists in 1917, tensions subsided somewhat, but Turkey’s accession into NATO kept embers smoldering.

After the fall of communism, Turkey saw an opening to expand its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as both regions are home to large populations of Turkic peoples. In the Caucasus, Turkey quickly became friendly with Azerbaijan, a country that speaks a language called Azerbaijani which is nearly identical to Turkish. Similarly, four of the five Central Asian countries, Tajikistan being the exception, that became independent in 1991 are Turkic countries that have varying levels of similarity to the Turkish language.  Turkey’s allies in the West considered its new potential for influence as positive, but Russia disagreed. 

To understand Turkish foreign policy, one must understand Turkish domestic policy under President Erdogan. Erdogan has been in power in Turkey since 2002 when his moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party swept to power. Though Turkey remains considerably freer than most countries that it surrounds, plenty of problems have arisen. Press freedom is under attack. The foreign policy program of “Zero problems with neighbors” has quickly become the exact opposite. The conflict with PKK terrorists in the southeast continues to fester. The economy is faltering. 

Turkish foreign policy took another hit when the Turkish Air Force shot down a Russian SU-24, especially after evidence emerged that the plane had spent less than a minute in Turkish airspace. 

Another squabble has to do with a small neighbor of both countries: Armenia. Turkey and Armenia have been at odds for over a century because Turkey refuses to call what the Ottoman Empire did to its Armenian population in 1915 genocide. Russia has recognized the events of 1915 as genocide since 1995 and because of this, Armenia enjoys relative friendship with Russia against Turkey and its other neighbor Azerbaijan, who also refuses to acknowledge the events as genocide. 

On the topic of Turkey’s oil-rich Azerbaijani cousins, Avinoam Idan, Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, stressed a relationship based on energy. Azerbaijan is sitting on a large amount of oil and Turkey hopes to get its hands on that oil. There also exists a possibility that a stronger Azerbaijan backed by will try to move towards unfreezing the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Russia, because of its friendly relationship with Armenia, would likely apply pressure on Azerbaijan to do the opposite by stationing more troops in Armenia. 

Russian support of Hezbollah, however, could hurt relations with respect to Israel and its borders, whereas it looks like Turkey and Israel are mending their relations. 

Another important point is that concerning NATO. NATO has doubled in size since the fall of communism, and most of the countries that have joined were once communist. The end of U.S. President Barack Obama’s second term may also entice the Kremlin into taking military action somewhere else as the South Ossetia conflict took place at the end of Bush’s 2nd term, though this may be pure coincidence.

Next to speak was Olga Oliker of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. It’s important to remember that neither Turkey nor Russia wanted to harm relations with the other country. The actions both countries are taking shouldn’t be described as a proxy war either as in the Syrian Civil War, Turkey and Russia “...are two different countries, supporting two different sides, for two different reasons.” 

Both countries are in a rut with economic problems in Russia and a wave of refugees spilling into Turkey, but Russia is more concerned overall with taking the stage as a great power than Turkey is and the Kremlin constantly is on the lookout for ways it can show Russia to be that great power. 

It’s also interesting to note that Turkey and the United States are not quite on the same side in the Syrian Civil War either and this represents an opportunity for the Kremlin to take action. 

The Kremlin’s openings for opportunities seem to come at the expense of the United States, which, according to Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to NATO. Indeed, the American involvement in the Syrian Civil War has been “bumbling”, while Turkey’s goals are clear, namely defeat of the PKK, the end of the Assad regime in Syria, and the prevention of an independent Kurdish state. Russia’s goals meanwhile run almost exactly contrary. The Kremlin is friendly with Assad and its involvement in Syria has definitively turned the civil war in favor of Assad’s forces and to some extent the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition in the north of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Armenians. Meanwhile, Washington, Mr. Volker argues, seems to be going back on its already loosely defined goals. The United States doesn’t want ISIS to be powerful, but at the same time action against them has been largely restrained, and there’s not been much cooperation on the Refugee Crisis in Europe. 

The personalities of the Turkish and Russian heads of state have been considered quite similar for some time. Erdogan has been accused by his critics of wanting to turn Turkey into a state similar to Russia where the President wields considerably more power than in Turkey’s present parliamentary structure. Perhaps unsurprisingly, both are disliked by pro-Western “liberal” Russians and Turks. And both leaders have led their respective countries into uncertain futures both on a global and domestic scale. 

Yashin presents report on Kadyrov

Russian dissident Ilya Yashin presented a report to the Atlantic Council in the United States about Chechen firebrand Ramzan Kadyrov on March 24. 

“People are afraid to talk about Kadyrov”, he said in his opening remarks. “Chechnya under Kadyrov is becoming a quasi-independent, quasi-Islamic state growing away from Russia.”

The tiny region in the Caucasus has come a long way since the two wars in the 1990s turned Groznyy into a living hell twice over. The city now glitters like Las Vegas, but behind the new buildings life is still difficult. Kadyrov is awash in wealth and Chechnya is constricted by rampant corruption, most obviously manifested in the Akhmat Kadyrov Foundation, which is a public fund that Chechens are required to pay into as a legalized system of tribute to Kadyrov. The Chechen firebrand is famous for his huge wealth, which he does not hesitate to flaunt with expensive cars and watches and even paying out sums of money to boxing legend Mike Tyson and soccer legend Maradona for appearances with him

Kadyrov rules Chechnya with an iron fist and frequently threatens members of the Russian opposition with assassination, and he is widely believed to be behind the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. 

Kadyrov is also a thorn in the Kremlin’s side despite Putin’s relationship with him. Nobody seems to know what will happen going forward, but prospects are bleak. Kadyrov is a dictator, but if he was to be ousted suddenly, enormous risk could turn into violence and even war. President Putin has at times tried to keep a tighter leash on Kadyrov’s outspokenness, but Yashin summed up the rut frankly “Unless Russian society speaks up, I don’t think Kadyrov leaves.” 

Some claim Kadyrov’s loyalists assassinated Boris Nemtsov on his orders in order to appease President Putin. The Kremlin claims that that is erroneous because “Putin was the last person interested in Nemtsov”. Indeed, Nemtsov’s time in the spotlight had dimmed considerably leading up to his assassination, but he was a major catalyst and the “backbone” of the opposition, Yashin described. And while Putin’s direct involvement  in the assassination is disputed even among the opposition, the Kremlin deserves to be given some indirect responsibility because they let Kadyrov become who he is today. 

The Caucasus is a powder keg, Yashin explained, and if Putin removed Kadyrov from power, “it would explode”. “Putin feeds the monster rather than fighting it, but sooner or later the monster could get out of his cage.” A third Chechen way is unlikely since “very few Chechens want to fight Russia again”. 

Kadyrov is active in intimidation of the Russian opposition outside Chechnya as well. Journalists, human rights activists, and NGOs are frequently targeted by Kadyrov’s goons and Kadyrov himself frequently posts open threats on social media with opposition figures’ heads in the crosshairs of a sniper rifle scope. Yashin himself was asked to cease using facebook by the Kadyrovtsi. 

Regardless of the hardship, Yashin vowed to continue his fight. “This is our duty regardless of danger. If we want to transform this country, we need to hit the weakest link in the chain, and that is Kadyrov.” 

Kadyrov is an ambitious man and notoriously distrustful of western values, and he uses the Chechen diaspora to his advantage, and he presents a grim challenge to Russian national security as well as international security. 

When asked about Kadyrov’s inclusion into the Magnitsky Act, Yashin claimed it was less important because he’s on multiple sanctions lists already. Instead Yashin called for an international investigation into Nemtsov’s murder, and he did not spare cold words for the Chechen leader himself. “Even if the opposition elects a president, I don’t believe in negotiation with Kadyrov. He is a murderer.” 

Kadyrov is a liability for Putin as well as for Russia. Yashin claims that “Kadyrov shows that Putin the Emperor has no clothes”. Indeed, Kadyrov has been compared to an extreme version of Putin, without the covertness of repression and international image. 

If an international investigation into the murder of Boris Nemtsov does conclude that Kadyrov had a hand, he could be a subject of discontent, but it’s going to take serious change for things to turn against him. He is not an adequate leader for Chechnya and if Russia is to improve its domestic security, there needs to be a change in the Kremlin’s attitude towards him. 

Boris Nemtsov's Life and Legacy

On March 8th, International Women's Day, a panel discussion was held at the George Washington University in Washington, DC to commemorate and remember the life of Russian politician and Putin dissident Boris Nemtsov.

Nemtsov's legacy was mixed. He promoted reform at the local level of government and was received by prominent heads of state such as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. President Bill Clinton as well as gaining some popularity in the city he built his political career, Nizhny Novgorod. His political prominence in the chaotic 1990s, however, managed to damage his reputation as a fighter of corruption. The 1998 financial crisis also severely hurt his popularity as he was Deputy Prime Minister when it struck. Before that, he looked like a front-runner to succeed President Yeltsin.

Nemtsov remained influential in the Russian government after 2000, but the rising popularity of the Putin administration and its ability to take credit for the economic surge that started in the early 2000s  unfortunately pushed him out of the Duma. After leaving the Duma, Nemtsov consistently and fervently opposed policies set forth by the Putin Administration, which he claimed were eating away at the Russian people's liberties. Nemtsov worked to provide a consistent voice against the most controversial actions of the Putin government including the military operations in Eastern Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the saga of Ramzan Kadyrov, and the Chechen Wars. For this Nemtsov was known as a "white crow" by his admirers, someone who fought for his principles rather than political expediency.

First to speak at the panel discussion was Andrey Markarychev, a fellow native of Nizhny Novgorod who now teaches at the University of Tartu in Estonia. Mr. Markarychev, like many in the Russian opposition was shocked to hear of Nemtsov's grisly assassination. He was most particularly interested in Nemtsov's exposure of corruption with regards to the Winter Olympics in Sochi and pondered the question-"What place does Nemtsov occupy in Russia and with respect to academic analysis?"

Why did Sochi pique Mr. Nemtsov's interests? For one, he ran for mayor of the Black Sea town. He seemed to believe that the Winter Olympics were not just a celebration of Russia and a mega-event to increase Russia's profile on the world's stage but a celebration of power for the Kremlin. To be clear, Nemtsov didn't oppose the Olympics in principle, but he had a keen eye to recognize the problems that came with it.

Still, his name was not seen much in the lead-up to the Sochi Olympics in many Western news media outlets. Western media was focused on an issue Nemtsov did not focus on at all-the discrimination of LGBT Russians. Nemtsov, by contrast, focused exclusively on corruption issues rather than social issues such as the evictions and environmental concerns.

Nemtsov knew he was facing an uphill battle. Support for the Sochi Olympics on one level was a loyalty test. Support for the Games meant, however indirectly, support of the Putin administration-to oppose the Games led to political isolation.

Mr. Markarychev also pondered what Nemtsov would have thought in regards to the upcoming FIFA World Cup set to happen in the summer of 2018. Sanctions and corruption scandals have already thrown it into question, and the Greek economic catastrophe is often said to have begun when Athens hosted the 2004 Olympic Games.

Nemtsov's national prominence ended in the 2003 State Duma elections in Russia and Professor Henry Hale presented a comprehensive analysis as to why that happened.

Nemtsov voters in 2003 favored a market economy, lived in cities, and favored a western-style democracy as the optimum system of government for their country. Nemtsov ultimately failed to get into the Duma because his pro-market stance was eclipsed by Putin's United Russia effectively taking credit for the economic upturn. By 2003, the Russian media, especially on TV, had become vigorously pro-Putin. The survey run also exposed the fact that Nemtsov's voter base was small to begin with and even if he had been able to get parliamentary representation, it would not have been much. The fractured nature of the "liberal" Russian opposition (for instance, the Yabloko party and their waffling on Chechnya) also meant Nemtsov had to fight against similar parties for the same representation.

That may be the most important lesson for the present-day opposition to learn. If they cannot unite, their small chances of gaining parliamentary representation may evaporate and they may be further undermined.